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NO. 29 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
Attack on the Open Skies Treaty 
President Trump Wants to Withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty 
Wolfgang Richter 
President Donald Trump has announced that the United States will leave the multi-
lateral Open Skies Treaty (OST). Russia could soon follow. The Trump administration 
would thus continue the US withdrawal from cooperative security and destroy an-
other piece of the arms control architecture. Its continued dismantling, a new arms 
race, and the return of armed conflict and nuclear warfare scenarios threaten Europe’s 
security and strategic stability. The OST permits cooperative observation flights over 
the territories of the States Parties. This allows for maintaining a minimum of military 
transparency and confidence-building, even in times of crisis. Such observation flights 
cannot be replaced by national satellite reconnaissance, especially since it is only 
available to a few states. Having the option to conduct independent observations is par-
ticularly important for allies in regions of tension. Germany and European partners 
must make a strong commitment to maintaining the OST. 
 
In October 2019, President Trump publicly 
announced his intention to terminate US 
participation in the Open Skies Treaty. NATO 
was officially informed of this position in 
November. On May 22, 2020, the US State 
Department gave notice on the intent to 
withdraw from the OST. US Defense Minis-
ter Mark Esper and Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo stated that the United States can 
no longer accept Russia not implementing 
the treaty adequately, as it has unlawfully 
restricted observation flight distances over 
the Kaliningrad exclave and established a 
10-kilometer-wide strip on Georgia’s dis-
puted borders that cannot be overflown. 
The reason is the conflict over Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. 
Although NATO allies share these con-
cerns, only Georgia has stated that this con-
stituted a substantial breach of the treaty. 
In 2012 Tbilisi therefore unilaterally sus-
pended the OST with regard to Russia. In 
response to unilateral Russian action, the 
United States has applied more severe 
restrictions on Open Skies (OS) flights by 
Russia over Alaska and the Pacific Islands 
since 2017. However, it did not claim ma-
terial breach and, therefore, did not sus-
pend the treaty when it gave notice of the 
intent to withdraw. Republican senators 
have long suspected that Russia is using OS 
observation flights over the United States 
for “espionage.” According to the State 
Department, Russia had “weaponized” the 
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treaty against US interests; therefore, it no 
longer had any strategic value. Moreover, 
the United States could achieve better ob-
servation results with satellites. 
A statement in favor of maintaining the 
OST was issued by Germany, France, and 
nine other European states on May 22, 2020. 
On the same day, the NATO Council meet-
ing demonstrated that European allies 
would not simply follow the United States 
in withdrawing, and that such an action 
has the potential to divide the alliance. This 
impression was reinforced when the Bun-
destag, with unanimous support from all 
factions, posted a letter to the US Senate 
and the House of Representatives calling for 
the US government to remain in the treaty. 
Purpose and Rules of the 
Open Skies Treaty 
The OST permits cooperative observation 
flights over the territories of the States 
Parties in the OSCE area between Vancou-
ver and Vladivostok. It offers transparency 
of military activities, even in times of crisis, 
and provides for additional verification of 
arms control agreements. In this way, it 
contributes – also through direct military 
contacts – to confidence-building and a 
realistic assessment of situations. 
The treaty was signed in 1992 and was 
applied provisionally for 10 years. It en-
tered into force in 2002, when 26 of the 
27 signatory states had completed their 
ratification procedures, including Russia 
after Vladimir Putin became president. The 
current 34 States Parties include almost all 
NATO states (except Albania, Montenegro, 
and North Macedonia), the EU states Fin-
land and Sweden, as well as Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia. 
The number of permitted observation 
flights is based on a quota system that takes 
into account the size of states. For the United 
States and Russia, which is part of a treaty 
union with Belarus, the treaty allows for 42 
observation flights each per calendar year; 
for Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, Canada, Ukraine, and Turkey, it is 12 
each. For the remaining states, graduated 
quotas apply, down to only two flights for 
smaller states, such as Portugal. 
No State Party may conduct more obser-
vation flights than its “passive” quota allows 
for others to fly over its territory. In addi-
tion, each State Party shall use only 50 per-
cent of its active quota for flights over an-
other State Party. Therefore, the United 
States and Russia may each use a maximum 
of 21 observation flights per year for mutual 
overflights. Nevertheless, the passive quota 
of 42 flights over Russia can be fully uti-
lized, as it is regularly crossed by aircraft of 
NATO partners as well as Finland, Sweden, 
and Ukraine. In contrast, there are far fewer 
OS flights over the United States, as allies 
do not verify each other. 
The OST allows the use of certain sensors 
for observation flights that must not exceed 
a defined image resolution from a range of 
flight altitudes. A resolution of up to 30 cm 
is permitted for analog and digital optical 
panoramic and framing cameras as well as 
video cameras with real-time displays. This 
corresponds to the resolution of the best 
commercial satellite images. The certifica-
tion of digital cameras has begun. For the 
future, the treaty also provides for night-
vision-capable infrared line-scanning devices 
with a resolution of 50 cm and sideways-
looking radar systems (Synthetic Aperture 
Radar) with a resolution of three meters. 
Such systems have not yet been introduced, 
however. 
Not all States Parties have their own OS 
observation aircraft or sensors. In the so-
called Pod Group, nine states share the use 
of aerial camera equipment. In addition, the 
treaty permits the use of aircraft of third 
states or of the observed state that have 
been certified for observation flights. Ger-
many had to make use of these options after 
the crash of its national OS aircraft in 1997. 
A new German OS aircraft (Airbus 319) 
was procured in 2017 and is planned to 
be operational by mid-2021. This will give 
Germany more flexibility in the event of a 
crisis to organize observation flights quickly 
and without lengthy coordination with 
partners. Nevertheless, the offer of coopera-
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tion with other interested states will be 
retained, be it by renting the German air-
craft or by the proven flight-sharing and 
the invitation of “guest observers.” 
OS observation flights are launched on 
short notice. The observing state must notify 
the observed state of the intent to do so at 
least 72 hours in advance. However, it will 
be informed of the selected flight route 
only after the observers have arrived in the 
observed state at the agreed point of entry. 
Once the route has been announced, a 
coordination process takes place, which 
may take no longer than eight hours. The 
observed state may change the planned 
route only in case of force majeure or un-
avoidable flight safety requirements. 
Twenty-four hours after the submission of 
the flight plan, the observation flight may 
commence, and it must be completed no 
later than 96 hours thereafter. This limits 
the ability of the observed state to organize 
significant changes on the ground, such as 
major troop movements. 
OS observation flights are, therefore, also 
more flexible than satellites, whose energy 
reserves are limited and allow only for a 
few changes in their defined orbits. In con-
trast, OS flights can be carried out on short 
notice with an appropriate flight route over 
an area selected by the observing state in 
accordance with situational requirements. 
Furthermore, observation flights in the 
agreed altitude range are also possible 
below cloud cover, which hinders optical 
satellite observation. 
Transparency Is Not Espionage 
In November 2019, a senior official of the 
Trump administration declared that Russia 
was using the OST for espionage. Allegedly, 
a Russian observation flight in 2017 flew 
over Washington and illegally observed 
critical military and political infrastructure. 
This seemed to confirm earlier allegations 
by Republican senators. 
But the accusation of espionage goes no-
where. Observation flights are not only co-
operatively agreed, but are also conducted 
together. Escort teams of the observed state 
are always on board together with observers. 
They monitor that the provisions of the 
treaty are abided by. OS aircraft, cameras, 
and sensors are only allowed if they have 
been certified by the States Parties and 
checked by the escort team prior to the 
flights. 
The resolution of the sensors is sufficient 
to differentiate between missile types, battle 
tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, 
other armored combat vehicles, artillery 
systems, aircraft, and helicopters. However, 
sensitive information about radio and radar 
emissions or the software of target acqui-
sition and guidance systems cannot be 
detected. 
In addition to the states participating in 
an observation flight, all other States Parties 
also receive the mission report. On request, 
they can purchase the image sequences 
obtained during the flights. In this way, the 
results of the observation flights are shared 
with 34 states, and the findings on military 
activities and the implementation of arms 
control agreements are multilateralized. 
Certainly, this information should also be 
given more attention in the discussions on 
risk reduction in the OSCE Forum for Secu-
rity Co-operation in Vienna. In contrast 
to the exchange of data gained through 
national intelligence, findings from OS 
observation flights are not subject to prior 
political selection and evaluation. The fact 
that the data are jointly collected – so that 
their authenticity cannot be disputed – is 
one of the most important advantages of 
the treaty. 
The accusation of espionage is a relapse 
into the language of the Cold War. At that 
time, it was the West that had to convince 
the Soviet Union of the confidence-building 
effect of military transparency. This view is 
now common wisdom in Europe and forms 
the basis of all arms control agreements. 
Proven Treaty Implementation 
Since the entry into force of the OST, States 
Parties have undertaken more than 1,500 
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observation flights, of which about 500 
were over Russia and Belarus, involving the 
participation of about 200 US missions. In 
contrast, Russia only conducted about 70 
flights over the United States between 2002 
and 2016, and it has used the bulk of its 
flight quotas for European countries. From 
this fact, unilateral advantages of Russia 
over the United States cannot be deduced. 
In general, the observation flights were 
carried out without major problems. They 
made a significant contribution to obtain-
ing objective information on the situations 
in the areas observed. In connection with 
the Ukrainian crisis and the military-politi-
cal tensions in the Baltic-Russian border 
region, Western states have intensified 
their observation flights regionally. Be-
tween March and July 2014 alone, they 
made 22 flights over western Russia and 
Ukraine. In December 2018, following the 
escalation in the Kerch Strait, a special 
observation mission was flown with the 
consent of all parties involved to assess 
the situation in the area of tension. 
However, political tensions have put a 
strain on the annual coordination of the 
distribution of flight quotas in the Open 
Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) and 
sometimes prevented agreement. Due to 
the Russian-Georgian territorial conflict, 
no observation flights were possible in 
2018. A Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus’ 
accession to the treaty has repeatedly called 
into question the consensual adoption of 
the OSCC agenda since its entry into force. 
In early 2016, Ankara refused a Russian ob-
servation flight in the Turkish border area 
with Syria. For a long time in 2013 and in 
September 2018, the United States delayed 
the certification of Russian digital cameras. 
In September 2019, Russia rejected a seg-
ment of a planned US-Canadian observation 
flight over an area in central Siberia where 
the large-scale exercise Tsentr was taking 
place. In addition, the United States has 
been restricting Russian flights over Alaska 
and the Pacific Islands since 2017. 
However, it was also possible to settle 
contentious issues amicably. For example, 
Russia lifted the minimum flight altitude 
over Chechnya in 2016. In general, the 
agreement has been implemented in 
accordance with its provisions since 2002. 
Georgian-Russian Conflict 
In 2012, Georgia suspended the OST with 
regard to Russia and did not allow any 
more Russian observation flights. Moscow 
had recognized Georgia’s breakaway terri-
tories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
independent states in 2008 and, since 2010, 
has applied the treaty rule of keeping a 
distance of 10 km from the border of non-
States Parties for OS observation flights. This 
was also met with criticism from Western 
states. But it was not until autumn 2017 
that the coordination of quotas for the fol-
lowing year failed when Moscow was no 
longer willing to accept the blockade of 
Russian observation flights over Georgia. As 
a result, no observation flights took place 
in 2018 – with the exception of the Kerch 
mission. 
Flights could only be resumed when Mos-
cow made concessions in the coordination 
of flight quotas for 2019. But this does not 
solve the problem. Since Washington is not 
interested in a solution and Moscow is also 
showing little initiative, the role of mediator 
would probably remain with the Europeans, 
and especially Germany, since the flight 
quotas are coordinated under German 
chairmanship. 
The conflict could be solved pragmatically 
if Moscow sticks to its recent policy of de facto 
non-application of the distance zone and 
Western states signal that they are not plan-
ning any flights in this zone. Given the 
range capabilities of the sensors, the 10 km 
zone is of little importance for the acqui-
sition of information. 
A compromise would be conceivable if 
Tbilisi and Moscow renounced maximum 
positions, a Western state like Germany 
allowed Russian guest observers to partici-
pate in a national mission over Georgia, 
and Tbilisi did not prevent this. At the same 
time, it would have to be made clear that 
compromise solutions would be “status-
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neutral,” i.e., would not affect the basic 
positions of the States Parties with regard 
to (non-)recognition of the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Flight Limitation over Kaliningrad 
The Russian limitation of air routes over 
the Kaliningrad exclave could also be ended 
pragmatically. The reason for the restriction 
was a Polish OS flight in 2014 that lasted 
several hours over this small area of only 
15,000 km². Therefore, the local airspace 
had to be closed for other flights. In doing 
so, Poland made full use of the treaty rules, 
which allow a maximum flight distance of 
5,000 km for the whole of western Russia 
from the Kubinka OS airfield. For Kalinin-
grad, the treaty does not provide for a sepa-
rate flight distance limitation. In order to 
avoid repetition, Russia then declared a spe-
cific route limit of 500 km for flights over 
this area that were to be started at Kalinin-
grad airport. 
In principle, the OST takes into account 
the size of the overflown areas when deter-
mining maximum flight distances. For 
example, there are limits of 250 km over 
the Danish Faroe Islands, 600 km over the 
Czech Republic, 1,200 km over Germany, 
3,000 km over Alaska, and 6,500 km over 
the Asian part of Russia. 
The unilateral Russian flight distance 
limitation over Kaliningrad does not pre-
vent the purpose of the treaty from being 
fulfilled, as observation flights over the 
exclave remain possible to a sufficient 
extent. Accordingly, there is no essential 
restriction on the implementation of the 
treaty (material breach). However, the OST 
does not permit unilateral rule changes. 
All modifications of its provisions must be 
agreed upon cooperatively. 
This can be prepared through consulta-
tions in the OSCC and negotiated in the 
forthcoming OST review conference. Due to 
the corona crisis, it will probably not take 
place until autumn 2020. Given the dis-
interest of Washington and Moscow’s pas-
sivity, the task of mediation would prob-
ably fall back to the Europeans, especially 
to Germany and France. In the United King-
dom – despite criticism from British ex-
perts of Trump’s course – the longer-term 
strategic interest in not positioning itself 
against the United States could prevail. 
A compromise could be to allow a new 
OS airfield in Kaliningrad and to agree on 
a flight route limitation that may deviate 
slightly from the unilateral Russian deter-
mination, but which does not overburden 
local airspace. Alternatively, St. Petersburg 
could be brought into play as the location 
of a new OS airfield with an appropriate 
flight path limitation, which Moscow itself 
could propose. 
Justification of the US Withdrawal 
from the Open Skies Treaty 
Washington has reacted to Russia’s limiting 
of the route over Kaliningrad by limiting 
Russian flights over and from Alaska, to 
such an extent that Russia’s planes can no 
longer fly over Hawaii and other Pacific 
Islands. The situation has not worsened so 
far. There is therefore no discernible reason 
for withdrawal from the treaty. Rather, it 
appears to be a fundamental decision by 
the Trump administration, which once 
again is expressing its growing distrust of 
multilateral agreements. 
The US representative informed NATO 
partners in Brussels of the intent to with-
draw from the treaty in mid-November 
2019 and May 2020. In the Republican 
camp of the Senate, there are voices that 
have long been campaigning for withdrawal, 
among them Senators Ted Cruz and Tom 
Cotton, in particular. At the end of October 
2019, they tabled a Senate resolution with 
the aim of withdrawing from the treaty. 
Behind it are arguments claiming that the 
treaty was of strategic disadvantage to the 
United States, and that Russian espionage 
posed a threat to national security. Secre-
tary of State Pompeo took up these allega-
tions by stating that Russia had “weapon-
ized” the treaty against US security inter-
ests. 
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Both allegations are without factual 
basis. Since 2002, the United States has 
undertaken three times as many observa-
tion flights over Russia as Russia has con-
ducted over the United States. In 2019, 
there were 18 US flights over Russia and 
seven Russian flights over the United States. 
According to the OSCC quota distribution, 
the number of Russian flights will remain 
the same in 2020, while the United States 
planned to use the maximum quota of 21 
flights over Russia. This plan, however, was 
cancelled on the day that the US withdraw-
al notification was sent out. 
If Russia wants to undertake observation 
flights over US territory, it must give 72 
hours of advance notice; the routes must 
be agreed upon and approved. Whether the 
sensors used are permissible is confirmed 
by a certification process in which US ex-
perts play a major role. Before the flights, US 
inspectors check the sensors of the Russian 
OS aircraft. During the flights, there are 
always US escort teams on board to ensure 
that the treaty rules and the agreed flight 
profiles and use of sensors are observed. 
The argument that OS images are quali-
tatively inferior to national satellite images 
is not valid either, since it is irrelevant for 
the purposes of the OST. It aims at coopera-
tively gained information, the factual basis 
of which cannot be disputed or manipulated 
in the political discussion, and which thus 
contributes to confidence-building. Above 
all, this argument ignores the interests of 
those States Parties that do not have national 
satellite reconnaissance and, particularly in 
regions of tension and conflict, rely on in-
dependent and objective information. 
Date of US Withdrawal from the 
OS Treaty 
The OST was concluded for an unlimited 
period of time, but the United States can 
withdraw from it at any time by issuing a 
respective notification to the depositary 
states Canada and Hungary as well as all 
other States Parties. Although the United 
States is not obliged to give reasons for such 
a withdrawal, it has argued that further 
implementation of the treaty was no longer 
compatible with essential national security 
interests, and it pointed out that Russia is 
not implementing the treaty adequately. 
After receiving the withdrawal notifi-
cation, the depositary states must convene 
an extraordinary conference of States Par-
ties within 30 to 60 days. This conference 
is scheduled to take place on July 6, 2020. 
Conference attendees will discuss the con-
sequences of the withdrawal of the United 
States from the treaty, which will take 
effect six months after the withdrawal 
notification, i.e., on November 21, 2020. 
However, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties allows for the suspension 
of the implementation of the treaty before 
the end of the period of notice. This would 
require a serious breach of the treaty that 
would no longer allow the purpose of the 
treaty to be fulfilled. The United States 
therefore suspended the implementation 
of the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-
Range Nuclear Forces on the day it gave 
notice of withdrawal. In regard to the OST, 
Washington did not take such an approach, 
as it was difficult to prove that the fulfill-
ment of the treaty’s objectives had been 
seriously impaired. It only announced that 
it would terminate all of its own flights. 
This will also affect partner countries with 
whom the United States planned to share 
observation flights. 
However, when the United States can 
give notice of withdrawal also depends on 
the complex rules of the US Constitution. 
They are disputed between the White 
House and Congress. What is clear is that 
any US commitment to a treaty under inter-
national law only comes into effect once 
the Senate has ratified it. The rules for the 
withdrawal of the United States from such 
treaties are far less precise. Traditionally, 
the president claims this right for himself, 
whereas Congress insists on its partici-
pation in such a decision. The Democratic 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the US House of Representatives, Eliot 
L. Engel, already warned against a with-
drawal from the OST in October 2019 in a 
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letter to the president’s Security Advisor, 
Robert C. O’Brien. 
Engel has recently accused the admin-
istration of having violated the conditions 
contained in the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2020. In its summary 
report on the act, the Senate, in December 
2019, called on the president to issue a 120-
day advance notice to Congress before for-
mally notifying the depositary states of the 
US withdrawal from the treaty. The act re-
quired the president to consult allies and 
explain in a report the reasons for a US 
withdrawal from the treaty and demon-
strate the disadvantages for national secu-
rity if the United States were to remain in it. 
However, irrespective of ongoing national 
discussions between the US government 
and Congress, it is the State Department’s 
withdrawal notification of May 22, 2020, 
that determines the international schedule. 
The notice period will expire on November 
21, 2020, and thus, the United States will 
withdraw from the OST well within the 
term of the current president. 
Consequences of the US With-
drawal from the OS Treaty 
The US withdrawal from the treaty does not 
mean that it would be generally terminated. 
Rather, the question arises as to how the 
other 33 States Parties will react. This will 
be discussed during the upcoming extra-
ordinary conference of States Parties, which 
will be convened on July 6, 2020. Apart 
from organizational questions, such as 
adapting the distribution of observation 
flight quotas, more general questions have 
to be evaluated, such as the future purpose 
and operation of the treaty, and which 
national conclusions States Parties will 
draw from the US decision. 
In particular, Russia would then have to 
decide whether to continue implementing 
the treaty in relation to the European states 
and Canada. The fact that Russia has under-
taken far more observation flights over 
European states than over the United States 
could indicate that it wishes to continue 
such flights. After all, it could gain insights 
into the movements of NATO troops, in-
cluding US forces, which are temporarily 
or permanently stationed in Europe. On 
the other hand, Russia would lose the possi-
bility of continuing aerial observation of 
the core territory of the United States. This 
is important both for reasons of political 
status and for the verification of US stra-
tegic nuclear arsenals. 
As allies regularly exchange intelligence 
findings among themselves, Moscow will 
probably also rightly suspect that Western 
States Parties will pass on to the United 
States the information gained from obser-
vation flights over Russia, although this is 
prohibited by the OST vis-à-vis non-States 
Parties. The question is whether this would 
be so serious an issue. Russia, too, is likely 
to receive covert information from its allies 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia on the 
implementation of the Treaty on Conven-
tional Armed Force in Europe, despite the 
fact that it suspended the treaty at the end 
of 2007. 
Weighing up these arguments, Moscow 
might give priority to the principle of po-
litical equality of status with Washington. 
Therefore, the possibility cannot be excluded 
that Moscow will also withdraw from the 
OST if Washington does. 
If this were to happen, the remaining 32 
States Parties could decide to maintain and 
further implement the treaty for reasons of 
principle. However, it would remain open 
as to what operational purpose they would 
pursue once the most important partners 
had left the treaty. Since allies, as a matter 
of principle, do not verify each other, West-
ern OS observation flights would be limited 
to Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The “neutral” EU states Fin-
land and Sweden could be added in order 
to exploit more flight quotas. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
If Washington terminates the OST, this 
could trigger a chain reaction that would 
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destroy another piece of the rules-based 
European security order and arms control 
architecture. The few remaining instru-
ments for de-escalation and confidence-
building in relations with Russia would be 
further dismantled, and European security 
would suffer additional damage. It is in 
Europe’s interest to prevent this. Time is 
pressing. 
Germany and France have demonstrated 
their special responsibility for saving the 
OST by organizing a strong declaration of 
11 European states. They should rally sup-
port also from other European states, in 
particular from a “group of like-minded 
states” that intends to renew conventional 
arms control in Europe. 
In addition, Germany and European allies 
should throw their weight in Washington 
at the highest political level in order to 
preserve the OST. In doing so, they should 
appeal to the US to demonstrate solidarity 
with its allies and recall that independent 
options for objective intelligence gathering 
are of great political importance, especially 
for the security of Eastern allies. 
Together with European allies, they 
should now take the initiative in the OSCC 
to resolve the problems of the flight dis-
tance limitation over Kaliningrad and the 
10 km distance zone to Georgia’s disputed 
borders. The compromise options outlined 
above could form the basis for agreeing on a 
solution to the implementation problems at 
the forthcoming extraordinary and review 
conferences. 
Furthermore, members of the Bundestag 
should follow up on their letter to the US 
Congress and stay in close contact to pro-
mote action for the US government to re-
main in the OST. 
Discussions with American officials and 
congressmen should express the European 
interest of keeping the OST with Russia. In 
addition, these talks should warn against 
the consequences of a US withdrawal. It 
must be made clear that the Europeans will 
not simply follow an American withdrawal 
from the treaty, and that the activities of 
American troops stationed in Europe would 
continue to be subject to observation by 
Russian OS flights. It should also be remem-
bered that, under the terms of the treaty, 
findings from European observation flights 
over Russia cannot be passed on to the 
United States. 
To Moscow, Europeans should signal 
their interest in preserving the OST. It 
should be encouraged to agree to a com-
promise solution for the implementation 
problems over Kaliningrad and on the 
Georgian border. In view of Europe’s secu-
rity crisis, an appeal to the common inter-
est to not further undermine stability 
would also be useful. 
If the United States were to withdraw 
from the OST, it would be important to con-
vince States Parties to continue implement-
ing the treaty. This intention should also be 
made clear to Moscow. The Kremlin should 
be encouraged to adhere to the treaty as 
well in order to allow for a minimum of con-
fidence-building in Europe in the future. 
If Moscow reacts to a possible withdrawal 
of Washington by leaving the treaty, Euro-
peans should nevertheless continue to im-
plement it for reasons of principle. This 
would leave the option open for the United 
States and Russia to rejoin it if political 
circumstances change. 
If the Open Skies Treaty is to be saved, 
now is the right time – and probably the 
last chance. Germany has a political and 
conceptual role to play in mediating and 
preserving the treaty as an instrument 
of military transparency and confidence-
building. 
Colonel (ret.) Wolfgang Richter is a Senior Associate in the International Security Division at SWP. 
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